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Abstract
Central to the official green growth discourse is the conjecture that absolute decoupling can
be achieved with certain market instruments. This paper evaluates this claim focusing on
the role of technology, while changes in GDP composition are treated elsewhere. Some fun-
damental difficulties for absolute decoupling, referring specifically to thermodynamic costs,
are identified through a stylized model based on empirical knowledge on innovation and
learning. Normally, monetary costs decrease more slowly than production grows, and this
is unlikely to change should monetary costs align with thermodynamic costs, except, poten-
tially, in the transition after the price reform. Furthermore, thermodynamic efficiency must
eventually saturate for physical reasons. While this model, as usual, introduces technolog-
ical innovation just as a source of efficiency, innovation also creates challenges: therefore,
attempts to sustain growth by ever-accelerating innovation collide also with the limited re-
action capacity of people and institutions. Information technology could disrupt innovation
dynamics in the future, permitting quicker gains in eco-efficiency, but only up to saturation
and exacerbating the downsides of innovation. These observations suggest that long-term
sustainability requires much deeper transformations than the green growth discourse pre-
sumes, exposing the need to rethink scales, tempos and institutions, in line with ecological
economics and the degrowth literature.
Keywords: Absolute decoupling; Wright’s Law; Moore’s Law; Energy; Social acceleration;
Degrowth.
1 Introduction
Will technological progress offset resource exhaustion and neutralize the environmental impacts
of growth? The answer given by the simulations in Meadows et al. (1972) well-known report on
the Limits to Growth was no. These authors concluded that growth-oriented policies had to be
urgently subverted to avoid societal collapse at some point in the 21st century. The political
challenge posed by this and many other studies (see, e.g., Daly et al., 1973) was taken by the
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green movement of the 70s-80s1 and has been more recently retaken with denominations such
as, notably, degrowth (D’Alisa et al., 2014; Kallis, 2018; Kallis et al., 2018; Hickel, 2019). The
mainstream position was quite different; it was defined by two contradictory responses from
neoclassical economists: (1) the assertion (emphatic, but without evidence) that technology
would offset these negative feedbacks (e.g., Solow, 1973) and (2) the continuing omission of such
feedbacks from formal growth models (to which Solow himself was a prominent contributor), in
which, when technological progress is switched off, economies just tend to a steady state not
followed by decline (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Recognizing that the feedbacks do exist,
the present paper gives some formal and evidence-based steps to clarify whether or not they are
going to be offset. In so doing, it addresses a key point of disagreement between mainstream
and ecological economics (e.g., Martinez-Alier, 2013), as is the soundness of long-term economic
forecasts and policies that neglect the biophysical dimensions of economies.
The rationale for the offset hypothesis was that resource scarcity would automatically create
price signals which would induce the due developments to enable resource efficiency or replace-
ment as needed (Solow, 1973). More recent mainstream literature takes this for granted (even
though long-term availability is uncertain and prices are heavily conditioned by other factors;
Kallis and Sager, 2017) and focuses its attention on environmental impacts, especially climate
change. Under the label of green growth it is claimed that such impacts can be tackled with the
help of price-based instruments such as taxes and tradable permits2 while economies keep grow-
ing; this is currently the dominant discourse of major multilateral institutions (OECD, 2011a;
UNEP, 2014). Other instruments are considered, but according to OECD (2011b, p. 12), only
when there are intractable political obstacles to price-based measures, and in no case questioning
growth itself.
Much of the discussion about green growth revolves around the potential for decoupling GDP
from the consumption of energy or materials or from greenhouse gas emissions, in particular
whether it is possible to move from relative decoupling (with such physical flows growing more
slowly than GDP but still growing) to absolute decoupling (with physical flows declining while
GDP grows). A number of arguments against the plausibility of absolute decoupling have been
advanced (e.g., Ward et al., 2016; Kallis, 2017), notably the mere observation that it is not
taking place, as is backed by a number of empirical studies which take into account international
fluxes (Steinberger et al., 2010, 2013; Bithas and Kalimeris, 2013; Csereklyei and Stern, 2015;
Haas et al., 2015; Plank et al., 2018; Cattaneo et al., 2018), with recent data indicating even
recoupling (Schandl et al., 2018). However, would stronger, generalized application of the due
pricing mechanisms permit absolute decoupling? The core results of the present paper concern
this point.
The eco-efficiency of an economy depends not only on the eco-efficiency of each production
process but also on GDP composition. The present paper focuses on the former, while the latter
will be treated in detail in a separate paper. In principle, absolute decoupling could be reached if
economic activity concentrated increasingly in less resource-intensive sectors (because of changes
in consumption, not offshoring, which is highly relevant at the level of specific countries; Stein-
berger et al., 2010, 2012; Plank et al., 2018; Cattaneo et al., 2018; Hardt et al., 2018). However,
1See, e.g., the documents in https://grunentodegrowth.wordpress.com/
2UNEP (2014) does not count tradable permits as price-based instruments, but, e.g., OECD (2011a) does.
Here, the second convention is followed.
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the viability of this process is not entirely clear (sec. 4.1) and, if it were driven by prices (either
because of green growth’s market instruments or because of resource depletion), it would com-
promise the access of lower-income strata to the resources needed to satisfy their basic needs.
This would contradict the purported goal to reduce poverty, which is a fundamental argument to
justify the growth component of the green growth binome (e.g., Smulders et al., 2014). The green
growth toolkit is ill-equipped to deal with this challenge, since it takes for granted mainstream
economic policies except in the quest to increase the use of instruments favoring eco-efficiency,
which is probably the reason why it also takes growth as the default tool to fight poverty. In
this aspect it differs sharply from degrowth proposals, which emphasize structural changes in the
management and allocation of resources. Degrowth does not mean negative growth but an exit
from the logic of GDP growth to prioritize long-term social goals within environmental limits,
whichever the implications for GDP, but assuming that this process will probably involve some
period of negative growth, at least in high-income countries (D’Alisa et al., 2014; Kallis, 2018;
Kallis et al., 2018).
Section 2 develops a stylized model of the dynamics of thermodynamic efficiency based on the
available knowledge on the dynamics of learning and innovation in general. This builds on Ward
et al.’s (2016) and Magee and Deveza’s (2017, 2018) previous work along related lines (compared
in sec. 4.1). Section 3 uses the model to tentatively identify the conditions for sustained decreases
in exergy consumption (or, proportionally, entropy production) to take place, considering pos-
itive, zero and negative growth. Within the Discussion (sec. 4), sec. 4.1 interprets the results,
and sec. 4.2 explores their practical relevance for the debate on limits. Section 4.3 notes that
increasing efficiency cannot be dissociated from other dimensions of technological innovation,
such as the creation of new environmental and social challenges, as well as mutations in the very
patterns of innovation, and discusses the implications for the feasibility of green growth. Section
5 concludes.
2 Model
The steps to find the maximum of a function, such as some measure of efficiency, cannot always
be defined a priori. This is the case when a problem combines features such as computational
intractability (Arora & Barak, 2009), partial information and open-ended possibilities. The many
steps that both biological and cultural evolution needed to reach some given solutions, and the
relatively wandering trajectories that led to such solutions, attest to the practical centrality of
this kind of problems. In such cases it is not possible to predict when some specific advances will
take place, but, when referring to more generic forecasts, empirical observations of innovation
and learning dynamics permit some educated guesses. It is on such guesses that the present
paper stands.
Traditionally, firms do not seek reductions in natural resource or emission intensity per se,
but reductions in monetary cost, of which the cost of natural resources is just one component.
However, knowledge on innovation to reduce monetary costs can help to characterize the dy-
namics of innovation more generally. Unfortunately, even in this well-documented context, large
uncertainties remain. A number of models exist (Anzanello and Fogliatto, 2011) for what is var-
iously termed experience curves, learning curves (Ko¨ler et al., 2006) or progress curves (Dutton
and Thomas, 1984). Such curves capture a combination of novel knowledge (either technological
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or of other kinds, either resulting from experience or from R&D investments), implementation
of such knowledge and gains in workers’ skills. Two especially popular models are Wright’s and
Moore’s. Besides their popularity, Nagy et al.’s (2013) analysis of 62 time series for different
products gave statistical evidence of the superiority of these two models over several alternatives,
with Wright’s performing marginally better than Moore’s.
According to Wright’s rule (better known as Wright’s law), costs c decrease as a function of
cumulative production Q following approximately a power law:
ct = aQ
−λ
t , (1)
where t is time and a, λ are assumed constant and positive. The rule was formulated by Wright
(1936) for airplane production, referring specifically to labor costs and also to (monetized) ma-
terial costs, which he found to be much less responsive to the accumulated experience (smaller λ
than for labor costs). Thereafter, it has been documented in many instances, mostly referring to
full monetary costs, both at the firm (e.g., Dutton and Thomas, 1984) and industry level (e.g.,
Weiss et al., 2010; Nagy et al., 2013). In sustainability science, Wright’s rule has been widely
used to estimate future monetary costs of different sources of energy, adding in some cases the
assumption of a floor cost that cannot be trespassed (Ko¨ler et al., 2006). With variables other
than monetary cost, the same equation has been widely applied in psychology to fit data of
individual learning (e.g., Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981).
According to Moore’s rule (better known as Moore’s law) when applied to costs, these would
decrease exponentially over time t:
ct = ae
−ht, (2)
where a, h are also constants expected to be positive. Wright’s and Moore’s equations can
be interpreted as different kinds of innovation, endogenous in the first case and exogenous in
the second (Nordhaus, 2014), but this distinction is often difficult to grasp from empirical data
because Eqs. 1 and 2 are equivalent when production increases exponentially (Sahal, 1979). Since
both forms of innovation are thought to operate, authors such as Nordhaus (2014) combine both
rules:
ct = aQ
−λ
t e
−ht. (3)
Nordhaus also assumes that there is bidirectional causality, from cumulative production to cost
and from declining cost to production growth (i.e., rebound effect; Schneider, 2008), and shows
that Eq. 3 is consistent with this assumption. In this paper, it will be assumed that Eq. 3 is
generally valid, with λ < 1. This assumption about λ, which implies diminishing returns, is
justified in the Appendix, and is more relevant for the results than the precise shape of Eq. 3.
Consider a scenario in which monetary prices are more aligned with resource or environmental
costs, or, in a theoretical extreme, the former are entirely determined by the latter. Would the
above relation still apply, and serve to forecast changes in eco-efficiency? The answer will depend
on the weight given to different dimensions of eco-efficiency. For example, CFCs were phased-
out by the Montreal Protocol without major disruptions, and, even thought they were largely
replaced by other halocarbons (Tollefson, 2009), it was quickly shown that, vested interests aside,
nothing prevented the entire elimination of halocarbons at least in refrigerators (Conrad, 1995).
Market signals appear to be less effective than regulation in this case (Tollefson, 2009), but both
regulation and strong enough market signals should have been able to terminate halocarbon use
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in this sector abruptly, rather than inducing an endless sequence of limited reductions in the
halocarbon cost of refrigeration in agreement to some rule such as Eq. 3.
In the scenarios explored in this paper, monetary cost is aligned, specifically, with thermo-
dynamic cost, i.e., with the exergy spent to carry out a given economic activity, directly or
indirectly, exosomatically or endosomatically (the spent exergy or exergy consumption is closely
related to what is normally called energy consumption but is a more precise measure, and is
proportional to entropy production (Dincer and Rosen, 2013); its relevance for sustainability is
discussed in sec. 4.2). It is argued below that, in the considered scenarios, reductions in thermo-
dynamic cost should differ sharply from the halocarbon instance and have features analogous to
reductions in monetary cost. Already with current price criteria, Wright’s equation (Eq. 1) with
λ < 1 has been fitted to a few production processes in terms of energy instead of monetary costs
(Ramı´rez and Worrell, 2006) and to many energy saving technologies in terms of monetary costs
(Weiss et al., 2010). These studies are encouraging, but the main arguments for this extension
are more fundamental.
While the theoretical possibility exists to develop technologies to dispense with specific re-
sources or emissions, the laws of thermodynamics imply that thermodynamic costs are and will
always be nonzero for all economic actions (Pueyo, 2003, p. 307)3. Not even the need for labor
is so fundamental. While conventional firms currently seek to reduce overall costs by addressing
the monetary cost of each of the elements that enters the production process (by refining the
techniques used in each of the production steps that take place within the specific industry and
also in their choice of inputs, which, on its turn, sends signals up the supply chain or network),
in the scenarios here considered they would change criteria and attempt to reduce the thermody-
namic costs of, at least, this same set of elements. Therefore, the problem would be similar, with
at least the same elements and the same structure of connections among them, not just within
each firm but throughout the supply network. What would change would be the weight given
to each of these elements, which would remain positive in all cases, and the possible addition of
even more elements which currently have no monetary cost. Generally, the complexity should
be expected to be the same or greater. Since Eq. 3 or some similar rule seems to apply to most
if not all production processes despite their great heterogeneity, and the elements entering such
processes do so with extremely heterogeneous weights, the assumed changes are unlikely to alter
this rule, except in that, in the thermodynamic case, it is certain that there is some nonzero
floor cost (a connection between thermodynamics and bounds to learning curves was already
suggested by Baumga¨rtner, 2002).
Let us thus adapt Eq. 3 for the application intended in this paper. A simple way to introduce
a floor cost cf (now referring to thermodynamic cost) is as an upward translation of c:
ct = cf + aQ
−λ
t e
−ht. (4)
This is indistinguishable from Eq. 3 when cf << ct. If exogenous innovation is excluded (h = 0),
it has the same form as a type of equation widely used in statistical physics to describe the relation
between different variables when approaching a critical threshold (Garrod, 1995). However, this
model is still insufficient because, like Eqs. 1-3, Eq. 4 presupposes some degree of constancy in the
3This is true provided that, when some given expenditure of exergy (either exosomatic or endosomatic) serves
multiple purposes, none of them is assigned 0% of the shared thermodynamic cost. Strictly speaking, the results
in this paper apply to accounting criteria that do not violate this principle
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parameters, while this paper deals with policy changes that increase the weight of thermodynamic
costs in monetary costs. Let us, thus, define t = 0 as the point in time at which the policy package
is implemented. At t = 0, there will be more opportunities for improvement than there would be
if the policy package had always been in place, case in which the same wealth of opportunities
would have been found at some t < 0, when Q was lower than Q0. Therefore, the impact of the
policy change will be tentatively introduced by replacing Q0 by the effective value Q
e
0 (Q
e
0 ≤ Q0)
that makes Eq. 4 consistent with the thermodynamic cost c0, i.e.,
ct = cf + a(Q
e
0 + [Qt −Q0])−λe−ht. (5)
Some aspects of this model need clarification. First, its output must be interpreted as a
lower bound to exergy consumption, because it does not include the added thermodynamic cost
of resource extraction as scarcity increases (Bardi, 2013), as well as possible costs of mitigation
of and adaptation to environmental degradation. Second, Eq. 5 is a smooth function, while,
in the psychological arena, Donner and Hardy (2015) found that individual learning curves
were punctuated by abrupt shifts, with only averages being well fitted by Eq. 1. Also the
collective accumulation of technical knowledge is punctuated by key inventions, so Eq. 5 should
be interpreted as a model for the average curve, but this is precislely the most relevant to
evaluate the viability and convenience of green growth. The mentioned results by Nagy et al.
(2013) were obtained by putting quite different technologies together when those performed the
same function. Third, the specific mathematical choices to adapt Eq. 3 to this context, which
result in Eq. 5, are tentative and in need of empirical evaluation. Fourth, innovation rates could
change nonlinearly in the future, which is discussed in sec. 4.3.
3 Analysis
GDP growing exponentially at rate r while keeping its composition constant is equivalent to each
sector’s production y growing at rate r; let us thus focus on a single sector. This section gives
some relations between production growth and exergy consumption that follow mathematically
from Eq. 5 with λ < 1. Let the policy package aligning monetary with thermodynamic costs be
applied at time t = 0. Let, thereafter, production y grow (or decline) at rate r, with r 6= 0 (the
case r = 0 is given special treatment below). Then, production at time t will be
yt = y0e
rt. (6)
The corresponding cumulative production Q is:
Qt = Q0 + r
−1y0(ert − 1), (7)
which, combined with Eq. 5, gives
ct = cf + a(Q
e
0 + r
−1y0(ert − 1))−λe−ht. (8)
Let us define the policy impact coefficient
p =
Q0
Qe0
(9)
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and
rb =
y0
Q0
(10)
(rb > 0), with rb being an integrated measure of the sequence of growth rates before t = 0.
The rationale for Eq. 10 is that, if before t = 0 production had grown at a constant rate for an
asymptotically long period, this rate would be rb. Combining Eqs. 9-10,
Qe0 = p
−1r−1b y0. (11)
From Eqs. 8 and 11, the thermodynamic cost is
ct = cf + ay
−λ
0 ([p
−1r−1b − r−1] + r−1ert)−λe−ht. (12)
Exergy consumption (proportional to entropy production) is
Et = ctyt. (13)
From Eqs. 6, 12 and 13,
Et = cfy0e
rt + ay1−λ0 ([p
−1r−1b − r−1] + r−1ert)−λe(r−h)t. (14)
These equations can be expressed more simply as a ratio to the initial values. Let us define θ as
the physical margin to reduce thermodynamic costs,
θt =
cf
ct
, (15)
so c0 = (1− θ0)−1(c0 − cf ). From Eqs. 12 and 15,
ct
c0
= θ0 + (1− θ0)
(
1 +
[
p
rb
r
]
(ert − 1)
)−λ
e−ht. (16)
Similarly, defining t =
Et
E0
, Eq. 14 becomes
t = θ0e
rt + (1− θ0)
(
1 +
[
p
rb
r
]
(ert − 1)
)−λ
e(r−h)t. (17)
Exergy consumption will decrease4 if and only if
r − h− λr
([
p−1
r
rb
− 1
]
e−rt + 1
)−1
+ r(θ−1t − 1)−1 < 0. (18)
A consequence is that decreasing production results in decreasing exergy consumption in all
cases: For r < 0, the first term in Eq. 18 is negative and the others are ≤ 0, giving a negative
sum.
4Exergy consumption will decrease, dEtdt < 0, if and only if
1
t−f
dt
dt < 0, where f = θ0e
rt, which gives Eq. 18
from Eq. 17.
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Let us move to the case of growing production (r > 0), which is more complex because of the
sum of positive and negative terms in Eq. 18. Initially (t = 0), exergy consumption will decrease
if and only if
r − h− λrbp+ r(θ−10 − 1)−1 < 0. (19)
This equation indicates that, even for large growth rates r, a large enough p would initially
result in absolute decoupling, if θ0 << 1. However, this effect would be short-lived. Only if r
approaches zero (or is negative) does p have a long-lasting impact. Otherwise, the policy shock
vanishes exponentially, giving
Et ≈ cfy0ert + ay1−λ0 rλe[(1−λ)r−h]t, (20)
or, in relative terms,
t ≈ θ0ert + (1− θ0)
[
p
rb
r
]−λ
e[(1−λ)r−h]t (21)
(where p and rb remain relevant only because of the division by E0). At this stage, exergy
consumption decreases if and only if
r(1− λ)− h+ r(θ−1t − 1)−1 < 0. (22)
A consequence of Eq. 22 is that endogenous innovation alone is unable to sustain absolute
decoupling, since this inequality is not satisfied for h = 0 (given r > 0). Would ordinary levels of
exogenous innovation suffice to achieve absolute decoupling? From U.S. data, Nordhaus (2014)
estimated a typical h ≈ 0.01 y−1 (for monetary costs). As a representative endogenous innovation
parameter, let us take λ ≈ 1/3 (corresponding to the 80% progress curve, which became standard
in the literature since first fitted by Wright (1936) to labor costs in airplane production, and
is far more optimistic than the value λ = 0.0732, or 95% curve, which Wright estimated for
raw material costs in the same context). Then, the breakeven rate of growth in which exergy
consumption would neither increase nor decrease would lie at some point between r = 0 and
r ≈ 0.015 y−1 (0 to 1.5 % per year; i.e., between -1 and 0.5% y−1 on a per capita basis should
population grow at 1% y−1), depending on θ. This suggests that, apart from a short period after
the policy shock, absolute decoupling would either be unfeasible or imply rates of growth that
are generally considered small, and also quite small rates of exergy reduction.
The condition for production growth closer to standard expectations without increasing ,
or, alternatively, more substantial exergy reductions without some production growth, would be
a greater h, which, in principle, could be attained by a boost in public research funding. From
Eq. 18, the h needed for constant  given a constant r > 0 (implying θt = θ0e
rt) would be
hdt = r − λr
([
p−1
r
rb
− 1
]
e−rt + 1
)−1
+ r(θ−10 e
−rt − 1)−1 (23)
or, after the policy shock vanishes,
hdt = r(1− λ) + r(θ−10 e−rt − 1)−1.
However, the required boost in public funding would meet increasing obstacles (discussed in sec.
4.1) and would become impossible before (possibly well before)
t∞ = − ln(θ0)
r
, (24)
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when h→∞ would be required. At that point, also relative decoupling would be impossible.
The case of zero growth (r = 0) needs special treatment because Eq. 7 does not apply. In
this case, for all t > 0, yt = y0 and, therefore Qt = Q0 + y0t. Introducing this expression in Eq.
5 and combining with Eqs. 13 and 11,
ct = cf + ay
−λ
0 ([prb]
−1 + t)−λe−ht
and
Et = cfy0 + ay
1−λ
0 ([prb]
−1 + t)−λe−ht,
or, equivalently,
t = θ0 + (1− θ0)(1 + [prb]t)−λe−ht. (25)
These are decreasing functions (unless λ = 0 and h = 0, in which case they are constant), with
 tending asymptotically to θ0.
Figure 1 gives, as an example, a set of exergy consumption trajectories differing in r but
sharing the other parameter values, calculated from Eqs. 17 and 25. As above, λ = 1/3 and
h = 0.01 y−1. The parameter θ is difficult to estimate and should differ substantially for different
cases; for this example, θ0 = 0.2 was chosen, meaning that there is the potential to reduce the
thermodynamic cost by 80%. The growth rate assumed to precede the new policy was rb = 0.025
y−1. Choosing a plausible p is not straightforward: this parameter defines the magnitude of the
low hanging fruits that permit a quick increase in efficiency right after the onset of the new
market signals. For r > 0, this is due to thermodynamic costs moving away from the trajectory
defined by Eq. 4 with Q0 replaced by Q
e
0 and converging to the trajectory defined by the same
equation with Q0 replaced by r
−1y0. Even thought the conceptual connection is vague, for these
examples p was decided by taking the case of unchanging growth rate, r = rb, and assigning
a value to γ =
c0(Qe0)−c0(pQe0)
c0(Qe0)
(with c0 calculated from Eq. 4 and using Eq. 11) in agreement to
the worldwide savings from adoption of best practice commercial technologies in manufacturing
industries estimated by IEA (2007, p. 35), of 18 - 26 %. From Eq. 5 and the definition of γ,
p =
(
1− γ
1− θ0
)− 1
λ
,
where c0 is the real initial cost c0 = c0(Q
e
0) (this expression reduces to p = (1−γ)−
1
λ for θ0 → 0).
The mid value of IEA’s range, γ = 0.22, corresponds to p ≈ 2.6, which was the assigned value.
The scenarios are: growth (with a relatively modest r = 0.025 y−1), low growth (r = 0.01 y−1;
i.e., r = h), zero growth (r = 0), and negative growth (r = −0.01 y−1). In the growth scenario,
exergy consumption  starts almost flat, as the leap to 11% lower c in the first five years almost
offsets the 13% increase of y in this period, where  increases just by 0.8%. The 22% reduction in
c corresponding to γ takes 11.45 years, at which point  has increased by 3.8%. After 25 years,
 has increased by 16%, and by 56% after 50 years, while c has been reduced just by 55%, still
far from the 80% allowed by physics in this example, i.e., (1 − θ0). In the low growth scenario,
there is absolute decoupling, with  first decreasing but then stagnating at about 20% below the
initial value. At the end of the series the rate of change in  is marginally positive, anticipating
a return to noticeably positive rates as further decreases in c become increasingly difficult. Both
zero growth and negative growth permit sustained decreases in ; at the end of the series, these
amount to 50% in the first case and 69% in the second.
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Figure 1: Example of trajectories of exergy consumption in a one-sector economy for different
growth trajectories, according to Eqs. 17 and 25, with strong environmental policies being imple-
mented at time t = 0. The x-axis is time in years, and the y-axis is the ratio  between current
and initial exergy consumption. Parameter values (sec. 3): λ = 1/3, h = 1% y−1, θ0 = 0.2,
p = 2.6, rb = 2.5%y
−1. Scenarios: Growth (growth rate r = 2.5% y−1), Low growth (r = 1%
y−1), Zero growth (r = 0), Negative growth (r = −1% y−1; these are absolute, not per
capita growth rates). These results do not include (1) the increasing thermodynamic costs of
extracting resources as they are depleted, as well as costs due to environmental degradation, (2)
the rebound effect and (3) 2nd-order innovation; these factors are discussed separately.
Figure 2 gives the trajectory of hd, defined as the minimum h to keep absolute decoupling
(Eq. 23), for the parameter values in the growth scenario above (except h). This value (which is
itself a rate of exponential increase) would need to double in the first 14 years. After 23 years
(with the policy shock having vanished), hdt starts to grow superexponentially, reaching h
d
t →∞
at t∞ = 64.4 years (Eq. 24). Figure 2b shows how t∞ changes as a function of θ0 (Eq. 24), for
the same r (this result is independent of λ, p and rb). A trajectory like that in Fig. 2a should
become unfeasible at some point before (possibly well before) t∞.
4 Discussion
4.1 Is absolute decoupling feasible?
The aim of the stylized model in this paper is to synthesize the available empirical knowledge
on the dynamics of innovation and learning and extrapolate it to a hypothetical green growth
10
Figure 2: Limits to decoupling by increasing exogenous innovation (e.g., with public research
funding). a: Trajectory of hd (% y−1) that, if it were feasible, would keep exergy consumption
constant (Eq. 23), for the parameter values of the growth scenario (except h), in which production
grows at 2.5% y−1 and physics permits a decrease in thermodynamic costs of 80% (θ0 = 0.2). At
t∞ = 64.4 years, hdt →∞ would be needed. Note that hd is itself a rate of exponential increase,
of what can be roughly interpreted as the amount of exogenous innovations per unit time. b:
Time t∞ (years) at which hdt →∞ would be needed to keep exergy consumption constant, also
for growth rate r = 2.5% y−1, but for different values of θ0 (the other parameters have no effect).
The plot does not cover all the asymptote θ0 → 0, t∞ →∞.
scenario, where a one-sector economy grows exponentially in a context that is capitalist but
with market signals that align prices with thermodynamic costs, as well as nongrowth scenarios.
Generic references to thermodynamics were central to foundational discussions on the limits to
growth (Soddy, 1922; Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; see also Baumga¨rtner, 2002). The present paper
uses a specific model (Eq. 5) to study the potential to decouple production growth from growth
in exergy consumption or entropy production, which are closely related to energy production but
have more precise physical meanings.
Normally, monetary costs decrease more slowly than production grows, because of mecha-
nisms that are likely to operate similarly if monetary costs align with thermodynamic costs (sec.
2). As a first approximation, innovation dynamics obey Wright’s rule (Eq. 1 with λ < 1), as
apparent from a number of empirical studies (sec. 1). Even though this rule contemplates no
physical limit to efficiency, it is incompatible with absolute decoupling, since it predicts a positive
growth rate of exergy consumption, (r(1−λ) > 0)5, for production growth r > 0. However, some
5The growth in relative exergy consumption consistent with Wright’s rule is found from Eq. 21 by removing
physical limits to efficiency (θ0 = 0), exogenous innovation (h = 0) and transient effects (p = 1, rb = r), which
results in t = e
r(1−λ)t for r > 0.
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departures from this rule can be considered. The model in this paper (Eq. 5) adds two factors
that make absolute decoupling more likely, namely, transient effects and exogenous innovation,
and one factor that constrains it: the unavoidable physical limits to efficiency. Other important
factors that make decoupling more unlikely were left aside, such as the rising thermodynamic
costs of extracting resources as these are depleted (Bardi, 2013) and of mitigating or adapting to
environmental degradation, and the rebound effect (Schneider, 2008), so, probably, green growth
is even less plausible than the model suggests. A phenomenon of potential future importance,
2nd-order innovation, is discussed in sec. 4.3. The model’s forecast for green growth is, roughly
speaking, a triphasic trajectory with these stages:
I- Initial response to the new market signals, resulting in an especially high degree of decoupling,
potentially absolute.
II- After the initial pulse dissipates, in no case can absolute decoupling be sustained by endoge-
nous innovation alone, and ordinary levels of exogenous innovation are unlikely to suffice.
III- Asymptotically, efficiency approaches its physical limit, there is no absolute decoupling and
even relative decoupling tends to vanish.
The transient character of the initial response to new policies (phase I) is consistent with
Hardt et al.’s (2018) observation of a substantial deceleration in the gains of thermodynamic
efficiency in the UK in recent years. Examples like this could help to improve the quantification
of the policy impact coefficient p (Eq. 11) for different policies, which is important because the
practical implications of this work will differ depending on the potential depth and breath of
phase I. The low share of energy in production costs is sometimes thought to imply that firms
could reduce energy consumption substantially with little consequence (major p could be easily
reached), but strong arguments have been given against this interpretation (Ayres et al., 2013;
Ku¨mmel and Lindenberger, 2014).
In phase II, after the transient effects have dissipated, only a high enough value of the exoge-
nous innovation parameter h (as compared to r) would permit absolute decoupling. Standard
values of h are unlikely to suffice, as apparent from the fact that, even in empirical studies that
treat all innovation as endogenous (with the consequent overestimation of λ; Nordhaus, 2014),
the results are mostly consistent with λ < 1 (Appendix), and also from the numerical example
in sec. 3 with plausible parameter values. Therefore, absolute decoupling would probably need a
substantial increase in h, and would be temporary, because h, which is itself a rate of increase,
would have to increase superexponentially beyond some point (Eq. 23, Fig. 2). A means exists
to boost h, as is public research funding, but any attempt to rise h would meet a number of
successive obstacles. First, the general difficulties to provide a public good, possibly magnified
by the neoliberal ideas and interests that the green growth project represents (see Dale et al.,
2016). Then, economic incompatibility with growth as other investment would be crowded out,
inviability for lack of means, and, finally, futility when efficiency saturates for physical reasons
(θ → 1 in phase III). Another fundamental problem of increasing h is treated in sec. 4.3.
These tentative conclusions refer to a one-sector economy, and would also apply to complete
economies if GDP composition did not change. This is not so clear once composition changes
are taken into account, but, continuing the comparison with non-environmental costs, the em-
pirical fact is that economy-wide total factor productivity does increase more slowly than GDP
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(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p. 439-440; assuming that the quantitative limitations of Solow’s
measure of total factor productivity do not alter the qualitative conclusion). However, this could
result from the rebound effect, which also poses a serious problem to green growth, but not
necessarily a definitive one if this were the only issue (see below). Yet, even if it is technically
possible to achieve absolute decoupling by inducing changes in GDP composition, this strategy
could have serious drawbacks (sec. 1), which are analyzed in detail in a separate paper.
Scenarios without growth give the best outcomes in sec. 3. These assume that Eq. 5 applies
also in the absence of production growth, due to the implicit premise that the stabilization or
contraction of production takes place in a controlled way, with a more selective allocation of
resources with social criteria (rather than being forced by a recession), as is sought by degrowth
proposals (D’Alisa et al., 2014; Kallis, 2018; Kallis et al., 2018; Hickel, 2019; analyzed in Pueyo,
2014). These results should be taken with special caution because the deep institutional changes
implied by degrowth could modify innovation patterns in one or another way. Furthermore,
the improvement could be overestimated if there are benefits of scale playing a direct role in
efficiency. On the other hand, the extra exergy costs due to resource depletion and environmental
degradation should be lower in nongrowing economies. In the model as it stands, the initial pulse
does not dissipate and is followed by continuing increases of efficiency (albeit at a lower rate than
in a growing economy), so there is a sustained reduction in exergy consumption.
The model in this paper (Eq. 5) is a first approximation, based on empirical evidence but
indirectly. It would benefit from econometric analyses designed to test, refine and, especially,
parameterize it. One specific feature of the model, which is the condition cf > 0, needs no
econometric analysis because it is imposed by the 2nd Law of thermodynamics (Pueyo, 2003, p.
307).
Ward et al. (2016) and Magee and Deveza (2017, 2018) also obtained results unfavorable
to absolute decoupling using learning curves. The novelties in this paper are: (1) While those
studies are based on Eq. 2, which applies most properly to exogenus innovation, here both
exogenous and endogenous innovation are considered (Eq. 5). (2) In line with Ward et al. (2016)
but differently from Magee and Deveza’s (2017, 2018), floor costs are introduced . (3) While
those previous studies refer to business as usual scenarios, this paper deals with green growth
and nongrowth scenarios. (4) In Magee and Deveza (2017, 2018) growth is endogenous, and
decoupling fails because of the rebound effect, while this paper addresses the thermodynamic
cost of some given, exogenous growth trajectories. The rebound effect has been signaled as a key
mechanism making the current economy unsustainable and as a serious obstacle to green growth
(Schneider, 2008). It is not the object of the above analysis because it has already been quite
studied and because green growth proposals contemplate instruments (OECD, 2011b) which, if
applied thoroughly enough, should serve to cap total resource use. The analysis in sec. 3 serves
to explore if growth would be compatible with such a thorough application of such instruments,
or with advanced levels of resource depletion, and gives serious reasons for skepticism. This
analysis must be complemented by considering possible future changes in innovation patterns,
which are discussed in sec. 4.3.
4.2 Relevance of exergy consumption
The measure of thermodynamic efficiency is one among many possible measures of eco-efficiency,
chosen because of the especially strong forecasts that it permits. This section discusses its
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relation to different dimensions of resource consumption and environmental impact, and the
broader implications of the results in sec. 3.
First, considering that the exergy needs of the economy are mainly supplied by the so-
called energy production (which is a meaningless expression in strict thermodynamic terms,
but will be used in this section with its ordinary meaning) and the appropriation of biological
production (including but not limited to food), the results in sec. 3 relate to different resources
and impacts to the extent that they are tied to these activities. Second, even for resource losses
or environmental impacts with little direct quantitative significance for thermodynamic budgets,
there will be thermodynamic costs involved in the recovery or replacement of such resources and
the mitigation of or adaptation to such impacts, which could be arbitrarily high depending on the
case. Third, even without any physical law making them indispensable, some sets of resources
or emissions might be so entangled in the economy that an equation of the same form as Eq.
5 should also apply to them, albeit, possibly, with cf = 0. In these cases, absolute decoupling
would be technically possible, but endogenous innovation would be unable to sustain it (a result
from sec. 3 that applies both for cf > 0 and for cf = 0).
Let us focus on energy production. The equations in sec. 3 can be used as a basis to tentatively
forecast various impacts mediated by such production. For example, let us assume that, during
some period, the carbon intensity κ of energy supply changes exponentially, κ = κ0e
ηt, where η
could be negative because of technological change or positive because of the decreasing quality of
remaining fossil fuels. Then, asymptotically (Eq. 20), since temperature is roughly proportional
to cumulative emissions (Bindoff et al. 2013), the expected increase of global temperature
attributable to the energy spent in a given (growing) economic activity since t = 0 would be
∆T =
(
ρκ0cfy0
r + η + 1
)
e(r+η+1)t +
(
ρκ0ar
λy1−λ0
(1− λ)r − h+ η + 1
)
e[(1−λ)r−h+η+1]t,
where ρ is the transient climate response to cumulative CO2 emissions (TCRE), whose likely value
is in the range 0.8-2.5 oC per 1000 PgC (Bindoff et al. 2013). Section 3 gives the conditions
for energy consumption to increase or decrease, and these can also be obtained for emissions.
In principle, ∆T can only increase unless emissions drop to zero (or are compensated by carbon
capture), because of its cumulative character (Bindoff et al. 2013). By definition, the depletion
of nonrenewable resources is also cumulative.
The significance of the results in sec. 3 for the viability of the green growth program largely
rely on the viability or not of a sustained and environmentally-friendly growth in energy pro-
duction (with no implication that this would be a sufficient condition). The complex simulation
models used by Hatfield-Dodds et al. (2015) in their influential report supporting the viability of
green growth in Australia and in the report by the same authors for the whole world (Hatfield-
Dodds et al., 2017) do not contradict the results in sec. 3 in that they expect growing energy
consumption in a growing economy. However, they claim that this is compatible with net green-
house gas emissions falling to zero, but they rely largely on biosequestration to reach this result,
so they switch from increasing warming to increasing occupation of suitable land, obviously a
limited resource (which might serve as a temporary relief for Australia but is much scarcer in
other countries). Furthermore, climate change is not the only problem posed by fossil fuels (to
begin with, their potential cumulative supply is indeed limited, even though the precise amounts
and the consequences for noncumulative supply are hotly debated; e.g., Bruckner et al., 2014;
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Hallock Jr. et al., 2014; Bardi, 2019), and every other energy source has its own constraints. For
example, even though renewable sources can supply energy indefinitely, their expansion is limited
(Garc´ıa-Olivares et al., 2012), by needs such as, again, suitable collection surface (Capella´n-Pe´rez
et al., 2017). If indefinite growth is sought, it is unavoidable that renewable energies compete for
space with natural ecosystems or with other economic activities. The case of agrofuels is espe-
cially problematic, since even their current modest production has already interfered with food
supplies (Eide, 2009). Moreover, Lopes Cardozo et al. (2016) estimate that massive conversion
towards renewables, fusion (should it ever proof workable) or other sources will need a transition
phase of several decades during which the supplied energy will be offset by the energy cost of
building the industrial capacity to supply it. These problems might be alleviated by emergent
solar technologies that, in addition to being little demanding in terms of material resources, are
claimed to provide high energy returns on energy investment (Zhou and Carbajales-Dale, 2018),
but even in this case the collection surface constraint should ultimately apply. In the longer term,
even sources such as hypothetical fusion reactors would cause a problem of excess dissipated heat
by-product, should energy consumption keep growing (Berg et al., 2015).
Even thought, in principle, all energy sources are subject to constraints, the magnitude of
such constraints is relevant and often unclear. The literature on this issue is vast, and an
exhaustive assessment will not be intended in this paper. However, a point to emphasize is that
the prospects for green growth and for growth in general cannot be assessed relying on economic
data and theory alone, since, among other inputs, the previous assessment of options for energy
supply is essential. It could be replied that completely new energy sources will be developed in the
future given the right market signals, so that energy forecasts should rely on economic forecasts
rather than the other way round, but this reasoning is flawed for a fundamental reason given
in Pueyo (2014, sec. 4.1). In that paper a distinction was borrowed from unrelated applications
in physics. On the one side, there are problems involving an asymptotically large number of
elements, which can and need to be dealt with in statistical terms (in physicists’ parlance, these
are the cases in which the thermodynamic limit is a useful assumption, and are the object of
statistical physics; Garrod, 1995). On the other side, there are problems involving a relatively
small number of elements, where the best predictions are obtained by considering the behavior
of each specific element and their specific interactions. Learning curves, which are central to
this paper, synthesize a large number of steps which can only be dealt with statistically, so
they belong to the first category6. It is in this category where economic stylized facts may be
meaningful. In contrast, there are just a handful of energy sources. Therefore, statistical records
and economic rules give little information about the prospects for new additions. The possibility
of breakthroughs in energy supply is worth discussing, but, being this a small number issue, this
discussion belongs to engineering, physics and Earth science, with little role for economics.
While the analysis of energy (exergy) suffices to conclude that long-term economic options
cannot be tackled by any economic theory detached from the natural sciences (i.e., by any
approach other than ecological economics) and that the prospects for green growth and for
growth in general are poor, it should not be forgotten that sustainability is not just a matter of
energy, so that many other aspects also merit independent consideration (e.g., Martinez-Alier et
6Therefore the present study is closely related to ecological econophysics (Pueyo, 2014), which synthesizes
ecological economics with econophysics, i.e., with the application of concepts and tools of statistical physics to
economics.
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al., 1998). Thus far, neither dollars nor joules can bring an extinct species back to life.
4.3 Evolving patterns of innovation and limits to assimilable innova-
tion
This section moves beyond the limitations of the model in secs. 2-3 by questioning two implicit
assumptions also shared by most of the related literature: (1) That the role of technological
development is only positive (also discussed by Pargman and Wallsten, 2017) and (2) that current
patterns of innovation (in this case, characterized by Eq. 5) are indefinitely extrapolatable.
Even if, by applying some given market instruments, eco-innovation becomes a major share
of innovation, innovation in other aspects will grow at similar if not greater rates, in some cases
just because it might be intertwined with eco-innovation. Policies to facilitate generic innovation
make part of the green growth programme, as a support for its more specific tools (UNEP,
2014). Furthermore, for endogenous growth theories, innovation is essential for growth (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). The basis of exponential growth according to these theories, as well as
the result of exponential growth according to most innovation models in sec. 2, is accelerating
innovation7. Unfortunately, accelerating innovation results in a number of challenges, which are
discussed below. Two implications follow. First, the need to understand and develop institutional
solutions to such challenges at a speed commensurate with the rate at which they emerge, which
is problematic if innovation accelerates through time. Second, the difficulty to develop such
solutions in a system that is based on competition and microeconomic growth imperatives (see
Richters and Siemoneit, 2018) rather than solidarity and sufficiency.
Albeit normally overlooked, the need to adapt the tempo of technological innovation to the
tempo of institutional adaptation was already discussed in Meadows et al. (1972). These authors
gave instances of geographic regions where the Green Revolution had improved people’s lives
and others in which the social side effects had been clearly detrimental, which they attributed to
preexisting institutional differences. In their words, such experiences show that social side-effects
must be anticipated and forestalled before the large-scale introduction of a new technology (...).
Such preparation for technological change requires, at the very least, a great deal of time. Every
change in the normal way of doing things requires an adjustment time, while the population,
consciously or unconsciously, restructures its social system to accommodate the change. While
technology can change rapidly, political and social institutions generally change very slowly. Much
more recently, even the literature on long-term implications of artificial intelligence (AI), which,
in general, is extremely technophile and pro-growth (Pueyo, 2018), has been warning of the need
to slow down the investment in AI development as compared to the investment in means to
prevent its potentially irreversible impacts (e.g., Bostrom, 2014), which, however, are thought of
as mostly technical means. Arguably, these would be useless in the absence of deep institutional
7In models such as those in sec. 2, innovations are generally assumed to result, in part, from experience,
whose proxy is cumulative production, and to result in increasing efficiency in terms of some measure, currently
monetary costs. If the number of innovations has a linear or a power law relation with cumulative production, or
with efficiency while far from its limit if any, exponential production growth will lead to exponential increase in
the number of innovations per unit time, i.e., to accelerating innovation, for all the models in sec. 2. This would
not be true if, e.g., the relation were logarithmic. Some evidence that the former is closer to reality is provided
by Magee et al. (2016), who found a power law relation of cumulative production and of cost with the number of
patents.
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changes (Pueyo, 2018).
The very challenges that recipes such as green growth pretend to solve were created by techno-
logical innovations in combination with economic institutional arrangements, and the adequate
institutional changes are indeed lagging behind, whether they are those promoted under the
umbrella of green growth, degrowth or any other. Unfortunately, accelerating innovation is ac-
celeratingly posing new challenges, from an exploding diversity of chemicals with deleterious or
yet unknown impacts on health and the environment (UNEP, 2019) to new technologies usable
for mass destruction, as was already the case of nuclear energy and appears to be the case of
developments not just in AI but also in several other emergent technologies such as nanotech-
nology or new methods of genetic engineering (see, e.g., Sutherland et al. (2016) for a review of
emergent threats, focusing on their significance for biodiversity). If the institutional capabilities
to manage such risks does not evolve at a commensurate speed, there will be an accumulation of
serious threats for civilization and the rest of the biosphere that will not be solved by increases
in eco-efficiency or by new energy sources.
Subtler social consequences of accelerating innovation are becoming ever more pervasive.
Technological acceleration, combined with market competition, are motors of what sociologists
call social acceleration (Rosa and Scheuerman, 2009; about the link to innovation, see, e.g.,
Lu¨bbe, 2009, p. 169-170), leading some aspects of society to change at accelerating rates and
forcing people to adapt. An example is the mounting pressure over workers to increase their
adaptability and allied capabilities, collectively known as employability (Chertkovskaya et al.,
2013). Due to what the economic literature refers to as bounded rationality, the human capacity
to process change, to adapt and to become adaptable have limits which will be overcome if
the pressure grows exponentially. As put by Lu¨bbe (2009, p. 175), Processes of growing up,
just like processes of growing old, become precarious if the quantity of cultural resources that
have consistent validity over the short duration of an average life dissolves with disorienting
consequences. This phenomenon holds some analogy to ecosystem degradation, which, in part,
is due to limited capacities to track anthropogenic changes (e.g., Devictor et al., 2012) rather
than the inherent implications of, say, a given temperature.
The pressure over people’s lives is not just due to the speed of change in general but also
to the fact that much cutting-edge innovation pursues efficiency in the absorption and use of a
limited resource as is human attention. This phenomenon was already conceptualized by Simon
(1971) as attention economy and it is becoming increasingly difficult to escape its influence8. If
models like the one in this paper apply, even approximately, in this case, exponential growth
will be linked to a roughly exponential increase in efficiency in the use of this resource (up to
saturation), i.e., efficiency in shaping preferences and behavior to the benefit of firms.
Such considerations become all the most important when taking into account the incipient
innovation in the very patterns of innovation. The disruption of traditional innovation curves is
underway because of design automation, which has been already going on for some time (Lavagno
et al., 2006). In the field of evolvable hardware there are instances of evolutionary algorithms
developing highly effective devices whose functioning was elusive for human engineers (Bostrom,
2014, p. 154). The substantial progress that most experts expect for AI after some decades
(Mu¨ller and Bostrom, 2016; Dafoe and Russell, 2016) is likely to result in deep changes in all
aspects of society, including the generalization of such second-order innovation. When this occurs,
8See the udpated information in http://humanetech.com/
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the model in this paper and the ensuing results will no longer hold, because that transformation
will open the doors to endogenous superexponential innovation. Superexponential innovation is
the condition noted in sec. 3 to sustain absolute decoupling beyond some point, but only until
the physical limit cf is reached, and if rebound (Schneider, 2008) is avoided. What this entails
in terms of ultimate limits to growth will depend on the significance of such enhanced innovation
for less clear-cut issues such as those dealt with in sec. 4.2. However, if this growth is to be
green or, more generally, serve the human interest, the problems dealt with above in this same
section become even more relevant. Even more important than human capacity to adapt to
accelerated changes would be the human limited capacity to take complex decisions, which, in a
system based of competition among economic units such as firms, is likely to mean, as noted in
Pueyo (2018), an unavoidable, massive automation of decisions, which would become ever more
unintelligible and could fully dissociate the directions taken by economies from human interests.
This section points to some widely ignored but crucial aspects for any economic recipe in-
tended to serve the human interest as green growth is supposed to (as well as for recipes intended
to serve the interests of other sentient beings). The first suggestion that emerges is that innova-
tion, however desirable it might be, would need to take place at some pace commensurate with
the capacities of people to adapt and of institutions to pre-adapt. Given the strong two-way
causal relation generally assumed to exist between innovation and growth, this is a reason to
abandon the logic of indefinite growth. The second suggestion is that, given the formidable
forces that technology is unleashing and their potential to produce mass destruction or mass
dystopia, the most basic institutional change that is needed is a transition from a system based
on competition and microeconomic growth imperatives (see Richters and Siemoneit, 2018) to
a system that favors solidarity and sufficiency, as previously discussed in Pueyo (2018). Pueyo
(2018) also suggests that the broad spectrum of the potentially affected by such impacts creates
some hope for collective action in this direction. Such a radical change will also be a form of
social acceleration, but transient and oriented by a common purpose, distinct from a state of
permanently accelerated and largely meaningless change.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to move beyond conflicting apriorisms and introduce a formal and
evidence-based approach to assess the feasibility of absolute decoupling and green growth. With-
out having reached a final answer, the limited available knowledge appears to give much more
reason for skepticism than for confidence, which supports ecological economists’ view that main-
stream economics’ neglect of biophysical dimensions is, at the very least, premature. Considering
the tentative results, or just the prevailing uncertainty, the author finds irresponsible the official
institutions’ messages implicitly presenting the conjecture of green growth as if it were a well-
established scientific truth, and, therefore, sidelining other mechanisms to deal with extremely
important and urgent global challenges. The paper has focused on the role of technological in-
novation and learning, leaving changes in GDP composition and their limitations for a separate
paper.
Having noted the little plausibility of technological innovation being quick and effective
enough to offset the resource and environmental pressures of growth, it is also suggested that ac-
celerating innovation poses inherent problems requiring institutional changes that can only occur
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at a limited rate, and that are especially difficult under the existing economic frameworks, which
would be perpetuated by green growth policies. The suggestion that follows is for institutions
to replace unfounded apriorisms by serious research, and for this research not focusing just on
techno-fixes but also on avenues for structural institutional change. Issues of speed, motivating
forces of economic activity and growth imperatives need to be seriously considered, as is already
attempted in literatures such as degrowth’s.
Appendix: Value of the learning and innovation exponent
λ
A basic assumption in this paper is that the dynamics of monetary cost reductions in current
economies have some general features that would be preserved should monetary costs align with
thermodynamic costs. Of special interest is the range of values currently taken by the learning
exponent λ (Eqs. 1, 3).
References abound to the 80% progress curve (e.g., Dutton and Thomas, 1984), because, in a
number of instances, doubling Q leaves c at approximately 80% the initial value, corresponding to
λ ≈ 1/3. To begin with, this was the value found by Wright (1936) for airplane production, in the
paper that introduced Eq. 1. However, he was quantifying specifically labor costs. Interestingly,
he found a much lower value for raw material costs, of λ = 0.0732, or 95% curve, meaning more
sluggish progress in this aspect (but this result might have been affected by the proximity to a
floor cost). Unless otherwise specified, the figures given hereafter refer to total monetary costs.
The variability in λ is high, but the average of the 108 firm-level instances in figure 2 in Dutton
and Thomas (1984) is precisely λ ≈ 1/3. However, the 62 industry-level estimates by Nagy et
al. (2013), which are classified by economic sector, suggest noticeable differences among such
sectors, with average λ ranging from 0.27 to 0.47.
More important in our case is that all the estimates in these two sources and in many others,
including the 331 analyses revised by Weiss et al. (2010), display λ < 1, as is also generally the
case for learning curves in psychology (Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981). The inequality λ < 1
has sometimes been used as part of the definition of Wright’s rule (Anzanello and Fogliatto,
2011). However, not all the estimates in the literature satisfy it. Notably, a large fraction of the
1,938 estimates in Dosi et al. (2017) (who use prices as a proxy for costs) display λ > 1, but
the estimates in this sample share some characteristics that may explain this observation. First,
these are firm-level values of λ (even though the values for different firms are aggregated and
an only figure is given for each product). Second, these are firms from an emergent economy in
process of catching up, India. In view of these two characteristics, much of the change in c is likely
to result from the quick incorporation of techniques that were already used elsewhere. Indeed,
the large growth rates of emergent economies has been interpreted as a feature of the process
of catching-up, which would end when they reach the technological frontier (Piketty, 2014), and
the same effect should be more pronounced for individual firms that have not even reached the
technological frontier of their own countries. In the context of the present paper, the main concern
is industry-level innovation; furthermore, transient effects are not considered valid to estimate λ
because they receive separate treatment. At industry level, λ < 1 is found for the 62 estimates by
Nagy et al. (2013) and in all the cases reviewed by Weiss et al. (2010), which include 132 energy
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supply technologies, 75 energy demand technologies and 124 other manufacturing processes. Yet
another feature of Dosi et al.’s estimates is that they are largely distorted by factors other than
cost reductions driven by cumulative production, as noted by the own authors and apparent
from the fact that not only a large fraction of estimates correspond to λ > 1 but there are also
a large fraction displaying λ < 0 (decreasing efficiency). Nordhaus (2014) claims, with the help
of empirical data, that estimates of λ are generally biased upwards and can give spurious results
greater than one when the contribution of exogenous innovation is ignored, by using Eq. 1 instead
of Eq. 3. For Nordhaus, realistic values of the learning exponent are in the range 0 < λ < 0.5.
Mechanisms that may contribute to the seeming ubiquity of Wright’s effect with λ < 0.5, or at
least, λ < 1, are learning-by-doing with diminishing returns, diminishing returns to R&D effort,
firms’ R&D effort increasing with production but decreasing as its returns decrease, and the
difficulties to accelerate the implementation of new techniques (including infrastructure renewal
and workers’ training) as much as to accelerate their development. Given these considerations,
in the present paper it is assumed that, as a general rule, λ < 1.
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